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INTRODUCTION
At the end of the twentieth century, the United States was an
international outlier in the severity of its juvenile sentencing practices
despite having invented the juvenile court model one century earlier.1
Today, juvenile sentencing reform is underway, particularly in the wake
of recent Supreme Court decisions that have cabined the states’ capacity
to impose extreme sentences on juveniles. In this Article, I propose two
additional reform measures that would help to rationalize the sentences
imposed on children in the American criminal justice system—one on
the front end of the system and one on the back end. In particular, on the
front end, in states where life without parole (LWOP) is still a lawful
sentence for a juvenile homicide defendant, courts should ensure that
children facing that sentence are afforded procedural safeguards akin to
those recommended for adults who face the death penalty. On the back
end, executive actors should install juvenile-specific clemency
boards—what I have called Miller Commissions—to give children
serving lengthy sentences a second look.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the extent and
nature of children in the American criminal justice system today. With
this context, Part II suggests that juvenile justice reform is underway in
*
Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America. Special thanks to all those who participated in the Wisconsin Law
Review 2014 Symposium and to its student members for their organizational and editorial
efforts.
1.
See infra note 2 and accompanying text.
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part because of collective agreement that policies of the late twentieth
century were misguided and, in great part, because of the moral
leadership of the Supreme Court in its recent juvenile sentencing
decisions. Part III offers two additional reform measures that are timely
and defensible in light of the Court’s recent decisions: enhanced
procedural safeguards for children facing LWOP and clemency
provisions tailored to youth serving long sentences.
I. KIDS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Historically, the United States has been a leader in juvenile justice
policy. The first juvenile justice system was created in Illinois in 1899,
and every state in the Union followed suit by instituting a separate
system for children accused of a crime or deemed delinquent.2 Prompted
by Progressive-era reforms,3 the early American juvenile courts shared
several notable features: a degree of informality relative to criminal court
proceedings, judicial discretion regarding the appropriate intervention for
each child, and an animating belief that childhood is a period of
dependency during which the state has an obligation to help a child in
jeopardy.4 Developed countries around the world have installed juvenile
justice systems modeled after this early American approach to children.5
Unfortunately, in a relatively short period of time, the United States
went from being a leader on the juvenile justice front to being an
international outlier in its harsh treatment of juveniles. By the late 1950s
and until the end of the twentieth century, politicians almost uniformly
assumed a tough-on-crime stance and codified an ever-growing and
ever-harsher set of penal laws.6 At the same time, determinate sentencing
schemes and transfer laws made it increasingly common for children to
be tried in adult court and exposed to generally applicable mandatory
minimum sentences.7 Until 2005, the United States was the only
2.
Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus, Introduction to CHOOSING THE
FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 1 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus
eds., 2014).
3.
AARON KUPCHIK, JUDGING JUVENILES 10–11 (2006).
4.
Id. at 51; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 6–7 (2005).
5.
Zimring & Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 1; see also ZIMRING, supra note 4, at
33 (“No legal institution in Anglo-American legal history has achieved such universal
acceptance among the diverse legal systems of the industrial democracies.”).
Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L.
6.
& POL’Y REV. 9, 10–11 (1999); see also Kimberley D. Bailey, Watching Me: The War on
Crime, Privacy and the State, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1539, 1544–48 (2014) (describing
the evolution of the war on crime from the 1950s through the 1990s).
7.
KUPCHIK, supra note 3, at 154–59 (discussing the three primary methods for
transfer of jurisdiction from juvenile to adult court); Special Report to the Congress:
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, U.S. SENT’G
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developed country that subjected children to the death penalty,8 and
today we are the only nation that continues to sentence children to
LWOP.9
Moreover, juveniles are regularly processed in the adult criminal
justice system. Over two million juveniles are arrested each year, and
approximately 250,000 of those arrests result in criminal cases in adult
court.10 Just like adults, above and beyond a criminal conviction, these
juveniles must contend with a host of collateral consequences, including
lost educational opportunities, limited employment prospects, lifetime
sex-offender registration, and potential adult sentencing enhancements in
future criminal trials.11 In sum, children are not an insignificant group
within the criminal justice system, and they present unique policy issues
precisely because they are children.
II. JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM UNDERWAY
By the turn of the twenty-first century, a nascent consensus emerged
regarding the broken nature of our juvenile justice practices. Crime rates
overall had been in steady decline for years.12 Criminologists’
predictions of a juvenile super-predator population had been debunked.13
Social and brain science had illuminated the ways in which juveniles are

COMMISSION,
http://www.ussc.gov/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/
mandatory-minimum-penalties/special-report-congress (last visited Jan. 2, 2015)
(discussing the trend toward mandatory minimums at the state level from the 1970s on).
8.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“Our determination that the
death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in
the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to
give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”).
9.
Brief of Amnesty Int’l, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2,
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 174238.
10.
Ashley Nellis, Addressing the Collateral Consequences of Convictions for
Young Offenders, CHAMPION, July-Aug. 2011, at 20, 20.
11.
See generally id.; see also Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical
Difficulties of Informing Juveniles about the Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6
NEV. L.J. 1111, 1114–15 (2006).
12.
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 5–8 (2007)
(documenting the dramatic and consistent decline in both violent and nonviolent crimes
in the post-World War II era); see also Warren Friedman, Volunteerism and the Decline
of Violent Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1453, 1453–55 (1998) (describing the
decline and noting competing explanations).
13.
See ZIMRING, supra note 4, at 120–22; Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence
Steinberg, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35,
36 n.6 (2010) (noting that the superpredator theory drove policy in the late twentieth
century, but that even its original proponents have acknowledged its inaccuracy over
time).
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less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation.14 And studies had
shown that incarceration has a criminogenic effect on youth.15 As
Professor Elizabeth Scott explains, by the early twenty-first century,
there had been a marked dissipation of the “moral panic[]” of the 1990s,
and “[m]any lawmakers and politicians—from the Supreme Court to big
city mayors—appear[ed] ready to rethink the punitive approach of the
1990s.”16
In this context, the Supreme Court tackled the question whether
states could subject juveniles to the most severe criminal sanctions—the
death penalty and LWOP. Beginning in 2005, the Court, in a series of
cases, developed a new Eighth Amendment jurisprudence around the
concept that “children are constitutionally different,”17 and it
significantly limited the extent to which states can impose extreme
sentences on children. First, in Roper v. Simmons,18 the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of juveniles, even those
convicted of homicide crimes.19 Five years later, in Graham v. Florida,20
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment also precludes a sentence of
LWOP for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses.21 And most
recently, in 2012, the Court held in Miller v. Alabama22 that, even when a
juvenile is convicted of a homicide offense, the states cannot impose
mandatory LWOP.23 These three decisions together stand for the
14.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (discussing
scientific and sociological studies demonstrating that children are less mature and more
reckless, that youth are more susceptible to outside influence and peer pressure, and that
personality traits in juveniles are not yet fixed).
15.
See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS:
THE CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 10–12 (2011), available at http://
www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-NoPlaceForKidsFullReport-2011.pdf (discussing such
studies and their results); see also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 13, at
56–60 (discussing studies examining whether more punitive laws and sanctions for
juveniles reduce recidivism and reaching the opposite conclusion); Christopher Slobogin,
Treating Juveniles Like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and Expanded Adult Court
Jurisdiction, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 126–27 (2013) (“Prolonged incarceration is also
counterproductive. As the research on deterrence implies, prison is criminogenic.
Transfer may keep a troublesome youth off the streets, but it increases the probability that
youth will turn to crime once back on the streets.”).
16.
Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile
Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 541 (2013).
17.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (“To start with the first set
of cases: Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing.”).
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
18.
19.
Id. at 578.
20.
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
21.
Id. at 74.
22.
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
23.
Id. at 2469.
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proposition that children are different in the eyes of the law, and
sentencing practices must reflect that fact.
It is hard to overstate the significance of the Roper/Graham/Miller
line of cases whether one looks at them in terms of methodology,24
implementation,25 or future implications.26 I have argued elsewhere that
the Miller decision was truly revolutionary in its logic and scope,27 and
that it portends significant juvenile justice reform measures.28 Some of
those measures are already underway. For example, a handful of state
supreme courts have held that the Miller decision applies retroactively,
enabling all juveniles currently serving LWOP even for a homicide
offense to seek a resentencing hearing.29 At the same time, some state

24.
For a discussion of the Court’s methodology in Graham and Miller, see, for
example, Douglas A. Berman, Graham and Miller and the Eighth Amendment’s
Uncertain Future, 27 CRIM. JUST. 19 (2013).
25.
A number of scholars, myself included, have weighed in on how the Court’s
recent juvenile sentencing decisions ought to be implemented. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan,
Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012); Cara H. Drinan, Misconstruing
Graham & Miller, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 785 (2014) [hereinafter Drinan, Misconstruing];
Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming Wave of
Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25 (2012) (identifying challenges of
implementation and future litigation issues); Lauren Kinell, Note, Answering the
Unanswered Questions: How States Can Comport with Miller v. Alabama, 13 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 143 (2013).
Scholars have only begun to explore the future implications of the Court’s
26.
recent decisions in the juvenile sentencing arena. See, e.g., Janet C. Hoeffel, The
Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: Now the Twain Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV.
29 (2013) (arguing that Miller calls into question current juvenile transfer laws); Shobha
L. Mahadev, Youth Matters: Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller and the New Juvenile
Jurisprudence, CHAMPION, Mar. 2014, available at https://www.nacdl.org/
champion.aspx?id=32599 (articulating plausible extensions of the Court’s recent
decisions); James Donald Moorehead, What Rough Beast Awaits? Graham, Miller and
the Supreme Court’s Seemingly Inevitable Slouch Towards Complete Abolition of
Juvenile Life Without Parole, 46 IND. L. REV. 671 (2013) (arguing that the Court’s
decisions indicate future abolition of juvenile LWOP altogether); Michael M. O’Hear,
Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087 (2013).
27.
See generally Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475126.
28.
Id.
29.
People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014) (holding that Miller
announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d
716, 732 (Neb. 2014) (same); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270,
276 (Mass. 2013) (same); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121–22 (Iowa 2013)
(same); Jones v. Miss., 122 So. 3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013) (same); Ex parte Maxwell, 424
S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (same). At the same time, many state supreme
courts have held otherwise. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. Finally, there is
also an emerging federal court debate on this question. Compare In re Pendleton, 732
F.3d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that prisoner had made prima facie showing that
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legislatures have passed comprehensive legislation in response to Miller.
In 2013, Delaware enacted a law that removes children from the reach of
the state’s mandatory first-degree murder sentence of death or LWOP.30
Under the new law, a judge will impose a discretionary sentence upon a
juvenile convicted of first-degree murder; the judge will consider the
youth-related sentencing factors as outlined by the Miller Court, and she
will be able to impose up to a life sentence.31 Even in cases in which the
judge imposes a life sentence for first-degree murder, she may designate
the juvenile’s sentence as subject to reconsideration after 35 years.32 The
new law also responds to the Graham Court’s directive by eliminating
LWOP for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses, and by making
some inmates eligible for a sentencing modification immediately.33
Finally, the law permits sentencing courts to order that juvenile sentences
run concurrently to avoid sentencing a child to a de facto life sentence.34
This legislation serves as a model for other states, as it reflects not
simply technical compliance with the Court’s recent juvenile sentencing
decisions but a rethinking of the way juveniles are treated in the criminal
justice system. West Virginia has enacted similarly broad legislation in
response to the Supreme Court’s recent juvenile sentencing decisions,35
and a handful of additional states have moved to at least reduce—if not
to eliminate—the sentence of LWOP for children.36
While these reform efforts are promising, much remains to be done
on the juvenile justice reform front. In the next Part of this Article, I
suggest two additional concrete reform measures that are achievable
given the political climate, and defensible under the Court’s recent
juvenile sentencing decisions.

Miller was retroactive), with In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2013)
(holding that Miller is not retroactive).
30.
S. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013), available at http://
legis.delaware.gov/LIS/LIS147.NSF/vwlegislation/1EA0FC1FD4DF714485257AFC005
2953C.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
H.B. 4210, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014) (making all juveniles
eligible for a parole review after 15 years).
36.
Hawaii Becomes Latest State to Abolish Juvenile Life Without Parole
Sentences, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (July 6, 2014), http://www.eji.org/node/924 (citing
Hawaii, Delaware, West Virginia, Texas, and Wyoming as states that have recently
eliminated juvenile LWOP); see also Reforms Since Miller, CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENT’G
YOUTH, http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/reforms-since-miller/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2015)
(demonstrating that 11 states have either eliminated juvenile LWOP or narrowed its
application in the two years after Miller).
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III. ADDITIONAL RESPONSES TO MILLER:
PREVENTIVE AND CORRECTIVE MEASURES
Despite the reform measures already underway in the wake of the
Miller decision, additional reforms are necessary in order to right the
course of juvenile justice in this country. In this Part of the Article, I
suggest two such reforms: 1) procedural safeguards for children facing
LWOP on par with what is recommended for adults facing execution and
2) clemency specifically tailored to individuals serving lengthy custodial
sentences for a juvenile offense.
A. Procedural Safeguards for Children Facing Life Without Parole
The Miller Court did not preclude the possibility of an LWOP
sentence for a juvenile homicide defendant; rather, it precluded that
sentence as part of a mandatory sentencing scheme.37 As such, juveniles
in more than half the states may still be exposed to the second-harshest
sentence under law.38 When the state seeks to impose LWOP upon a
juvenile homicide defendant, state court judges should ensure that
children facing that sentence have a right to counsel on par with what a
capital defendant deserves, specifically a team that includes at least a
mitigation specialist.39 As I explain below, a state court judge would be
amply justified in doing so based on Supreme Court precedent.40
First, in capital cases, the Supreme Court has held that adequate
investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence are required for
constitutionally effective representation. For example, in Williams v.
Taylor,41 defense counsel failed to discover and present evidence that
documented Williams’s extensive childhood abuse and mental
impairments.42 Applying the Strickland v. Washington43 test, the
Supreme Court held that counsel’s representation of Williams had been
deficient and that the inefficacy prejudiced the outcome of his case.44
37.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
38.
Id. at 2471 (identifying 29 jurisdictions that made LWOP mandatory for
some juveniles convicted of murder in adult court).
39.
See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_repres
entation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter AM. BAR ASS’N GUIDELINES].
40.
I am exploring this concept in greater detail in a forthcoming piece. See
Drinan, supra note 27.
41.
529 U.S. 362 (2000).
42.
Id. at 370.
43.
466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing a two-pronged test for claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel).
44.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 398–99.
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Similarly, in Wiggins v. Smith,45 defense counsel failed to put on any
evidence regarding the defendant’s childhood neglect purportedly for
strategic reasons.46 Again the Court found that counsel’s failure to
present such “powerful”47 mitigating evidence prejudiced the outcome of
the defendant’s case and was ineffective assistance of counsel.48 As
scholars have recognized, in this line of cases culminating in Wiggins,
the Court “promoted a longstanding guideline of the ABA—that capital
counsel thoroughly explore the social background of the defendant—to
the level of constitutional mandate.”49
In addition to employing a heightened standard of review in capital
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Supreme Court recently
suggested that LWOP for children is tantamount to the death penalty.
The Graham Court employed its categorical approach in assessing
Graham’s proportionality challenge—an approach it had previously
reserved for capital cases.50 In assessing Graham’s challenge, the Court
noted that LWOP sentences “share some characteristics with death
sentences” in that “[t]he State does not execute the offender sentenced to
life without parole, but the sentence alters the offender’s life by a
forfeiture that is irrevocable.”51 Further, the Graham Court recognized
that LWOP as applied to children is especially harsh given the
percentage of his life that a child will service in prison as compared to an
adult.52
The Miller Court continued to treat LWOP for children as
comparable to a death sentence. The majority recognized that, in capital
cases, the Court “has required sentencing authorities to consider the
characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before
sentencing him to death.”53 And it noted that, because
“Graham . . . likened life without parole for juveniles to the death
penalty itself,” the same individualized sentencing requirement must
apply when a juvenile faces an LWOP sentence.54 Finally, the Miller
45.
539 U.S. 510 (2003).
46.
Id. at 525.
47.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 536.
48.
49.
See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV.
226, 282 (2003).
50.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60–62 (2010).
51.
Id. at 69.
52.
Id. at 70. (“Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve
more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A
16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same
punishment in name only.”)
53.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463–64 (2012) (citing Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)).
54.
Id. at 2463.
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Court explained that youth itself is “more than a chronological fact” and
may be the most powerful mitigating factor available to a defendant:
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into
account the family and home environment that surrounds
him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no
matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of
his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he
might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if
not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example,
his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors
(including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his
own attorneys. . . . And finally, this mandatory punishment
disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the
circumstances most suggest it.55
The Court has now married these two lines of precedent—the line
elevating mitigation to a constitutional requirement for capital defendants
and the line treating LWOP as tantamount to a death sentence for
children. Accordingly, state court judges should ensure that, just as in
capital cases, juveniles facing LWOP receive representation on par with
best practices for death penalty representation.
The ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (the Guidelines) provide a good
starting point for what this kind of juvenile representation might look
like.56 The Guidelines state that defense counsel in capital cases must
have sufficient training and expertise in capital representation.57 In
55.
Id. at 2467–68 (citations omitted).
56.
See AM. BAR ASS’N GUIDELINES, supra note 39. As this Article was being
edited, the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth announced the publication of the
first Trial Defense Guidelines for counsel representing youth who face a life sentence.
Consistent with the arguments I make herein, the new Guidelines are based, in part, on
the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases. To view the new Guidelines, see DEFENSE GUIDELINES FOR CHILD
CLIENTS, THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH (Mar. 2015), available at
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Trial-Defense-GuidelinesRepresenting-a-Child-Client-Facing-a-Possible-Life-Sentence.pdf. It remains to be seen
how courts will deal with the enforcement of these standards when reviewing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in the future.
57.
See AM. BAR ASS’N GUIDELINES, supra note 39, Guidelines 5.1, 8.1.

212

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

addition, the Guidelines highlight the importance of mitigation evidence
in their requirements that defense counsel have sufficient skill in
investigating and presenting mitigation evidence, as well as experience
working with expert witnesses, especially mental health experts.58 The
Guidelines also recognize that, given the complexity of capital cases,
even qualified defense counsel cannot work alone. Thus, the Guidelines
describe a “Defense Team,” which includes lead counsel and at least one
associate counsel, a mitigation specialist, a factual investigator, and at
least one member trained to screen for mental or psychological disorders.
Finally, the Commentary to the Guidelines makes clear that the Team
described in the Standard is a minimum and that lead counsel is
responsible for ensuring that, if additional skill and expertise are
required, other members will be added to the team (or if funds are not
available, the issue is at least preserved for appeal).59
If juveniles facing LWOP are analogous to adults facing the death
penalty, as I argued above, then it follows that such juveniles should
enjoy protections analogous to those set forth in the ABA Guidelines.
First, juveniles facing an LWOP sentence should have counsel
experienced in the representation of juveniles and, in particular, juveniles
facing adult sentences in adult court.60 Second, because of the emphasis
that the Miller Court placed upon mitigation evidence in juvenile LWOP
cases, it also makes sense for juveniles to have a defense team
comparable to that contemplated by the ABA Guidelines for death
penalty cases. Theoretically, this means that the juvenile’s lawyer should
have co-counsel, a factual investigator, a mitigation specialist, and some
team member who is trained to screen for mental health issues.61 Just as
the Guidelines state that death penalty counsel should retain “any other
members needed to provide high-quality legal representation,”62 so this is
true in juvenile LWOP cases. Because of the unique characteristics of
youth, this may require defense counsel to retain an expert who, for
example, can testify to the fact that the juvenile brain is not fully
developed and to the criminogenic effect of incarceration on youth.63
By ensuring that juveniles facing LWOP have representation on par
with the ABA’s Guidelines for capital cases, state court judges can
guarantee that juveniles facing LWOP receive an individualized sentence
58.
59.
60.

See id. Guideline 5.1.
See id. Guideline 10.4 Commentary.
See generally NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., NATIONAL JUVENILE
DEFENSE STANDARDS 21 (2012) (discussing Standard 1.3 “Specialized Training
Requirements for Juvenile Defense”), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/
NationalJuvenileDefenseStandards2013.pdf.
61.
See AM. BAR ASS’N GUIDELINES, supra note 39, Guideline 10.4(A), (C).
62.
See id. Guideline 10.4(C).
63.
See id.
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as contemplated by the Miller Court and that the LWOP sentence is
imposed only in the most extreme cases. This procedural safeguard
would go a long way toward implementing the vision of the Miller
Court.
B. Child-Friendly Clemency
Even if additional procedural safeguards are made available to
juveniles facing LWOP at sentencing, there is a need for executive relief
on the back-end of the sentencing process. To begin, many state
legislatures have yet to respond to Miller in a comprehensive manner,
leaving some inmates who may have a claim under Miller in limbo. At
the same time, state courts are split on the question whether Miller
applies retroactively. Six state supreme courts—those in Texas, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Iowa, Mississippi, and Nebraska—have applied the
decision retroactively.64 Five state supreme courts—those in Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Louisiana, and Alabama—have held that
Miller applies only to future juvenile homicide defendants.65 In the latter
five states, there are approximately 1,200 juveniles serving LWOP.66
Unless the Supreme Court of the United States holds otherwise,67 these
1,200 inmates will never have an opportunity to have their
64.
People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014) (holding that Miller
announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d
107, 117 (Iowa 2013) (same); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270,
281 (Mass. 2013) (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013) (same); State
v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014) (same); Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66,
68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (same).
65.
Ex Parte Williams, 2015 WL 1388138 (Ala. Mar. 27, 2015) (holding that
Miller does not apply retroactively); State v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 841 (La. 2013) (same);
People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 808 (Mich. 2014) (same); Chambers v. State, 831
N.W.2d 311, 316 (Minn. 2013) (same); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa.
2013) (same).
66.
See How Many People Are Serving in My State?, CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR
SENT’G
YOUTH,
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/reports-and-research/
how-many-people-are-serving-in-my-state/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
67.
The Supreme Court will not address this question until sometime during its
October Term 2015. After declining to review a state supreme court decision holding that
Miller was not retroactively applicable, Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 6–10, cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2724 (2014), the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the same question, see Toca
v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 781 (2014), only to have the case mooted by the named
defendant’s release. See generally John Simerman, George Toca, La. Inmate at Center of
Debate on Juvenile Life Sentences, to Go Free, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE, Jan. 30, 2015,
available at http://www.theneworleansadvocate.com/news/11462053-123/george-tocalouisiana-inmate-at. Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court granted cert on this question
again in Montgomery v. Louisiana, see Certiorari—Summary Dispositions, SUPREME
COURT
(Mar.
23,
2015),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/
032315zor_b97d.pdf.
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sentences—which are now unconstitutional—reconsidered absent a grant
of executive clemency.
Finally, even if held retroactively applicable, Miller does not reach
all inmates whose cases one may think deserve reconsideration under the
Court’s rationale. Consider, for example, a 15-year-old convicted of
murder and sentenced to 55 years with a mandatory additional 25 years
for the use of a firearm. That person is now serving an 80-year sentence,
in part because of a discretionary sentence and in part because of a
mandatory sentencing enhancement. It is not clear that this 80-year
sentence is within the Miller Court’s ban on mandatory LWOP sentences
for juveniles. However, the Roper/Graham/Miller rationale—that kids
are less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation—suggests that this
15-year-old deserves reconsideration of his sentence.
For all of these reasons, state executive actors should appoint Miller
Commissions specifically designed to examine the validity of extreme
sentences for juveniles.68 At a minimum, the charge of these Miller
Commissions should be to identify all state inmates affected by the
Graham and Miller decisions, to identify a range of appropriate
sentences for such inmates, and to make recommendations to the
governor regarding each inmate. This will ensure evenhanded application
of constitutional law across the country, and it will afford juveniles relief
under Miller in an efficient, streamlined manner.
Once in place, these Commissions could provide secondary
benefits. That is, Commissions tasked with bringing states into
compliance with Miller would also be well positioned to review other
juvenile claims of excessive sentencing, such as the 80-year hypothetical
sentence described above. Moreover, Miller Commissions would be
equipped to review the claims of those who are no longer incarcerated
but who are hampered by the collateral consequences of a juvenile
conviction.
In order to accomplish these tasks effectively though, state
executive actors must provide a clear mandate for Miller Commissions.
First, because so many states have abolished parole or narrowed its
application,69 and because clemency grants are rare nationwide,70
68.
I first proposed this idea in an earlier article in which I suggested that these
commissions would be an efficient way for states to comply with the mandate of the
Miller Court. See Drinan, Misconstruing, supra note 25, at 794. Here, I am developing
that idea further and suggesting that the role of such Commissions could be broader and
more ambitious.
69.
See generally Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prison Re-entry in the United
States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479 (1999) (describing abolition of and limitations on use of
parole nationwide).
70.
See Adam M. Gershowitz, Rethinking the Timing of Capital Clemency, 113
MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (“Over the last half century, clemency has become a rarity.
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executive actors must articulate the rationale for Miller Commissions and
be willing to use their bully pulpit to support them.
Second, executive actors should provide clear criteria for the Miller
Commissions to employ in their review of juvenile cases. Standard
criteria for parole and/or early release may provide a starting point. For
example, relevant variables have historically included: “the offender’s
participation in prison programs; infractions of prison rules; job
opportunities upon release; family ties; the seriousness of the original
offense; expressions of remorse and repentance; the risk of recidivism;
and the views of victims, community members, prosecutors, or
sentencing judge.”71
But Miller Commissions also must undertake a deeper inquiry—at
least in reviewing cases in which an inmate is serving LWOP. A juvenile
serving LWOP is already serving a sentence that, as the Miller Court
explained, should be “uncommon” given everything the Court has said
“about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for
change.”72 And, according to the Miller Court, an LWOP sentence may
only be imposed after an individualized hearing.73 In this sense, the
Commissions need to undertake something closer to a resentencing
hearing than a parole hearing. The Miller Court set out factors that
should be relevant at a juvenile’s individualized hearing, and Miller
Commissions should employ these factors in their decision making.
These factors include:
[C]hronological age and its hallmark features—among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences[,] . . . family and home environment[,] . . . the
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of
his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him[,] . . . incompetencies
associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with
police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement)

While there have been more than 1,300 executions since the Supreme Court reinstated
capital punishment in 1976, there have been only 66 individualized commutations. By
contrast, in the first half of the twentieth century, 1 out of every 4 or 5 death sentences
was commuted to life imprisonment.”) (citations omitted); see also Rachel E. Barkow,
Clemency and the Unitary Executive, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484586 (describing the decline of federal clemency).
71.
Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1745, 1750–51 (2012).
72.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
73.
Id. at 2475.
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or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys[,] [and capacity for
rehabilitation].74

Finally, in asking whether an inmate has undertaken to rehabilitate
himself, the Commissions must take into account what services have
actually been made available to the applicant.75
There is the question of who should serve on Miller Commissions.
Many jurisdictions do not have parole boards in place that regularly
review parole applications, let alone parole applications from inmates
who were convicted as juveniles.76 Scholars are in agreement that boards,
rather than individuals, tend to make better clemency decisions.77
Further, there are some accepted best practices in terms of executive
clemency board composition. Such boards should give equal voice to the
law enforcement community and to those who advocate for holistic
criminal justice reform and effective reentry. And such boards should
reflect diversity in race, ethnicity, and gender.78 Above and beyond these
general principles, a Commission designed to review the parole and/or
clemency applications of inmates serving time for a juvenile conviction
must have expertise regarding juveniles on a variety of fronts. Preferably,
there should be members of the Commission who have a working
knowledge of juvenile brain development, juvenile representation within
the jurisdiction, and juvenile modes of incarceration within the
jurisdiction.
Miller Commissions as I have described herein would provide an
additional path toward correcting the course of American juvenile
justice.

74.
Id. at 2468.
75.
As I have written about previously, a court or executive body cannot assess
whether an inmate has demonstrated growth and rehabilitation without examining the
conditions of confinement the inmate endures. See Drinan, Graham on the Ground, supra
note 25, at 78–81; Drinan, Misconstruing, supra note 25, at 793; see also Tamar
Birckhead, Children in Isolation: The Solitary Confinement of Youth, 50 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512867 (describing
the most extreme type of confinement for youth, its reasons, and its harms).
76.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing the widespread
elimination and narrowing of state parole provisions).
77.
Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123,
1152 (2012).
78.
Id. at 1154.
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CONCLUSION
The Miller decision was capacious in its language, breadth, and
vision. Already, some states have responded in ways that bode well for
holistic juvenile justice reform. These responses suggest that the two
proposals I make in this Article may be timely and achievable.
Having said that, the proposals I make here are short-term solutions
to long-term problems. There needs to be a national conversation about
juvenile justice and how we deviated so far from the original concept of
rehabilitation for juveniles. Only in the context of that conversation can
we begin to unravel the many problems with the status quo and to
implement the vision of the Miller Court.

